We prove strong completeness of the □-version and the ◊-version of a Gödel modal logic based on Kripke models where propositions at each world and the accessibility relation are both infinitely valued in the standard Gödel algebra [0,1]. Some asymmetries are revealed: validity in the first logic is reducible to the class of frames having two-valued accessibility relation and this logic does not enjoy the finite model property, while validity in the second logic requires truly fuzzy accessibility relations and this (...) logic has the finite model property. Analogues of the classical modal systems D, T, S4 and S5 are considered also, and the completeness results are extended to languages enriched with a discrete well ordered set of truth constants. (shrink)

Pourquoi parle-t-on si facilement de l'âme d'un violon, d'une poutre, d'un canon et avec plus d'embarras, de l'âme humaine? Le mot "âme" a des résonances qui pour beaucoup paraissent suspectes. Nombre de nos contemporains pensent ou préfèrent se passer de la notion d'âme qu'ils jugent désuète, mythique ou trop chargée de religieux. Et s'il y avait une relation étroite entre le refoulement du religieux et celui de l'âme? se demande Xavier Lacroix. De même que le religieux est porteur d'une (...) signification qui lui est propre, de même la notion d'âme est-elle porteuse d'une signification qui va plus loin que les notions modernes par lesquelles on croit la remplacer. En vérité, le terme d'âme est irremplaçable. Nous n'en avons pas fini avec lui, qui implique la raison et la foi, le bon sens et la Révélation. (shrink)

Est-ce un hasard si Jean-Marc Ferry, d'un côté du Rhin, Jürgen Habermas, de l'autre, entrouvrent aujourd'hui la porte de la République au discours religieux? Si la raison publique faite de liberté et d'égalité semblait suffire pour régir le champ économique et social de notre Modernité première, elle s'avère trop courte lorsqu'il s'agit de formuler la norme commune applicable aux fondamentaux de l'existence tels que la vie, le corps, l'amour, la mort... D'où l'appel de nos deux auteurs aux ressources de sens (...) qu'ont accumulées les religions et, singulièrement, le christianisme. Pour prendre cette requête au sérieux, il fallait revisiter les grands axes de la tradition chrétienne (création, faute, incarnation, salut, trinité, eucharistie) pour en dégager les enseignements qui enrichiraient la raison publique d'aujourd'hui. Mais la foi se laissera-t-elle ainsi arraisonner? Et la raison s'ouvrira-t-elle à ce discours qui vient de plus loin qu'elle? La partie est loin d'être gagnée. Xavier Dijon la mène avec grand talent. (shrink)

"Beau mystère que ce Mémorial l Que s'est-il exactement passé, ce 23 novembre 1653? Qu'a voulu dire Pascal avec ces phrases tronquées ou allusives? De quel Feu parle-t-il? De quelle certitude? De quelle séparation? A qui s'adresse-t-il? Les mots énigmatiques qu'il énonce, je pressens qu'ils sont la clef d'une vie. Je suis aussi curieux de les décortiquer que si j'avais retrouvé la bande sonore de l'Annonciation ou la vidéo de la chute de Paul de Tarse sur le chemin de Damas. (...) Mais au-delà de la curiosité vient l'aventure : la lecture de Pascal m'entraîne plus loin que je voudrais". Par le commentaire suivi qu'il fait du Mémorial en tant qu'écrivain et romancier, Xavier Patier nous offre une entrée personnelle et magnifique dans l'oeuvre et la pensée de Blaise Pascal. (shrink)

Comment se fait-il que l'intuition intellectuelle bannie par Kant ait ete si promptement reintegree par ses meilleurs disciples? Et pourquoi l'intuition ainsi rehabilitee a-t-elle fait aussitot tache d'huile, s'associant a toutes sortes d'evenements et d'etats psychiques, sans perdre pour autant son caractere intellectuel? A ces questions majeures l'historiographie n'a fourni qu'un debut de reponse. En vue d'ouvrir un debat, on a voulu enqueter sur place, dans le milieu philosophique et culturel de l'Idealisme et du premier Romantisme, avec la methode historico-critique (...) utilisee naguere dans Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir, dont ce livre est un regain tardif. (shrink)

Pourquoi Empédocle a-t-il recouru à la forme poétique pour exposer sa pensée? Empédocle réinterprète la langue, les techniques et la visée sociale des grands poèmes épiques et didactiques de la Grèce archaïque pour adapter les ressources à un projet dans lequel poésie et philosophie sont indissociables.

Pouvons nous parvenir à connaître Dieu par l'exercice de notre intelligence ou bien devons nous nécessairement, passer par un acte de foi qui semble remplacer la raison? La question n'est pas d'aujourd'hui. Saint Thomas d'Aquin, théologien du XIIIème siècle, en a déjà longuement débattu. En faisant l'effort de nous replonger dans ses écrits très modernes, nous découvrons que la foi ne remplace pas l'intelligence mais au contraire en exige le recours indispensable. Ainsi, cette réflexion nous préserve-t-elle de tomber dans les (...) erreurs d'une idéologie qui défigure la dignité humaine comme le risque de l'intelligence artificielle ou de l'obscurantisme religieux. L'actualité nous met en présence de la confrontation de plus en plus violente entre l'indifférentisme de la laïcité et la religiosité sous une forme intégriste et radicale. Seul un juste équilibre entre la foi et la raison peut nous conduire à la lumière de la sagesse où toutes les vérités partielles s'organisent et s'ajustent pour conduire à la vérité tout entière qu'est le Christ."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ce livre part du différend qui a opposé Frege et Husserl à propos du psychologisme. Comment ces deux pensées tournées vers une réflexion sur l'arithmétique ont-elles pu parvenir à deux conceptions si différentes de la logique? Il est apparu qu'il s'agissait d'évaluer l'idée de représentation qui est au coeur du problème. L'un et l'autre la conçoivent de manière différente : Frege pense qu'il s'agit d'une faculté psychologique indispensable à l'être humain pour agir. La pensée commence lorsque le lien avec la (...) nature est rompu : le langage naturel et les langages artificiels permettent de s'affranchir du rapport de la représentation à l'action. Husserl ne croit pas que le recours aux symboles et aux signes soit nécessaire pour s'affranchir du rapport à la sensibilité et penser. Il suffit que la représentation se réfléchisse en représentation de la représentation. Le désaccord vient donc d'une conception différente de la représentation et des symboles pour penser. Faut-il (se) représenter pour penser ou y a-t-il place pour une pensée symbolique et aveugle? Toute une métaphysique sous-jacente apparaît qui, à partir de la distinction transcendantal-symbolique, pose le problème du temps à l'intemporel, de la liberté à la loi, de l'idéal au virtuel... (shrink)

L’ouvrage de Tyler Stovall, professeur à l’université de Californie-Berkeley, marque par son ambition. Investissant une période et un cadre géographique sur lesquels l’historiographie abonde, il parvient en effet à proposer une analyse qui fait bouger les lignes, en mobilisant et en faisant travailler les trois catégories du « triangle de fer » que sont la classe, le genre et la race (p. 112). T. Stovall se focalise sur l’année 1919 qu’il envisage non comme un point de bascule, mais comme un...

According to sparse modalism, the notion of essence can be analysed in terms of necessity and naturalness. In this paper, I develop and defend a version of sparse modalism that is equipped with a non-standard, relativized conception of naturalness. According to this conception, properties and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different kinds of things, and relations can be natural to different degrees relative to different slots. I argue that this relativized version of sparse modalism can accommodate (...) various cases that the standard, non-relativized version can’t. The alternative version can accommodate cases where a relation is essential to a relatum but merely necessary to another, cases where a property is essential to an object but merely necessary to another, and cases where a less-than-perfectly natural property is essential to an object. (shrink)

Qui n'a souvenir de la grande palabre sur la philosophie africaine? Paulin Houtondji, Marcien Towa, Eboussi Boulaga, Niamkey Koffi et bien d'autres y ont valablement laissé du leur au point de s'imposer aujourd'hui comme des références incontournables de la philosophie d'Afrique. On est parfois tenté de songer à la fin de l'activité philosophique chez les Africains avec ceux-là. C'est justement à cette éventuelle fin que refusent de souscrire aussi bien le philosophe congolais Claver Boundja que l'équipe de jeunes philosophes ayant (...) tous pour ambition "de réouvrir à nouveaux frais le débat sur le développement en Afrique". L'à-propos quant à l'absence métathéorique que la théorie du développement de Boundja vient combler dans la philosophie contemporaine fait l'unanimité parmi les contributeurs. En outre, la théorie philosophique du développement de Boundja se démarque de la conception marxiste de celle-ci, dans la mesure où Boundja ancre la pensée philosophique fondamentale de type métaphysique dans la question du développement humain. Elle s'émancipe du volet socio-économique avec ses pesanteurs sociohistoriques pour interroger le bien-être non calculé de l'humain. Dans une herméneutique circonstanciée, les auteurs examinent le développement non pas en confinant celui-ci aux vues de Boundja, mais en l'ouvrant aux interrogations sur l'humain et ses conditions ou ses possibilités de réalisation de vie épanouie. C'est pourquoi Boundja est tantôt questionné, tantôt exploré comme atelier pour l'émancipation féministe, tantôt encore mis en dialogue avec Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, V.Y. Mudimbe non sans évoquer en filigrane, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, etc."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ésta es una contribución al debate originado por Guillermo Hurtado y proseguido por Manuel García-Carpintero y Horacio Luján Martínez, con relación al sentido y a los objetivos de la filosofía analítica, especialmente en Iberoamérica. En ella se defiende que las tesis de Hurtado también se pueden aplicar al cultivo de filosofías no analíticas, pues en realidad conciernen a la filosofía profesional que se practica dentro y fuera de Iberoamérica. Se sostiene, además, que si bien la profesionalización y la masificación de (...) la filosofía son fenómenos en sí mismos positivos, tienen consecuencias colaterales negativas respecto de la calidad de la filosofía que se produce. También se aduce que el que una propuesta filosófica no tenga una inmediata relevancia existencial o política no la hace menos importante, siempre que en algún sentido amplíe las fronteras del conocimiento. This is a commentary on a debate originated by Guillermo Hurtado and followed up by Manuel García-Carpintero and Horacio Luján Martínez, in regards to the meaning and objectives of analytic philosophy, especially in Latin America. This paper holds that Hurtado's theses are also true about non analytic philosophy, since they are about professional philosophy, as practiced both inside and outside Latin America. Professionalization and popularization of philosophy, while positive phenomena in themselves, have negative collateral consequences on the quality of philosophy produced in the present moment. it is also held that the fact that a given philosophical proposal has no immediate existential or political relevance doesn't make it less important, as long as in some sense it widens the frontiers of knowledge. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v32-33-cerda.

L'ordre juridique qui se met en place, en France, aux derniers siècles du Moyen Âge a encore tout récemment été l'objet de riches débats : l'auto-développement des coutumes, l'autorité des droits savants et l'interventionnisme du roi de France ont notamment été au cœur de vives controverses historiographiques. La lecture des sources est à l'origine de querelles interprétatives, auxquelles s'ajoutent des difficultés méthodologiques que rencontrent les historiens du droit. Tandis que l'historien n'a accès qu'à une proportion infime du concret, celui-ci s'efforce (...) de combler ces lacunes, parfois même à l'aide d'une projection des catégories juridiques contemporaines. Cet anachronisme des concepts – parfois couplé à un anachronisme des faits – ne constitue-t-il pas l'un des vices rédhibitoires de la discipline? Cette méthode ne présente-t-elle pas, à l'inverse, une indéniable vertu heuristique et disciplinaire? Certains estiment alors que la théorie du droit est anhistorique, quand d'autres critiquent l'emploi par les historiens des concepts contemporains, comme la hiérarchie des normes, la souveraineté ou encore l'État. Outre de telles projections, c'est le sens donné à certains signifiants médiévaux ou modernes qui peut être relativisé, comme c'est le cas notamment pour les notions de droit positif, de droit commun ou encore de loi. Ces difficultés révèlent aussi à certains égards l'ambivalence de l'histoire du droit, écartelée entre science historique et dogmatique juridique. Ce livre propose alors une réflexion épistémologique sur l'un des grands enjeux de l'historiographie juridique contemporaine : peut-on penser l'ordre juridique médiéval et moderne à partir des catégories juridiques contemporaines? (shrink)

Five essays, each on a different contemporary philosopher. Those on Franco Lombardi, Sartre, and Leszek Kolakowski and other present-day revisionist Marxists were presented at an American Philosophical Association symposium in 1961; the studies of Xavier Zubiri and Heidegger were added specially for this volume. In each case the authors endeavor to say something fresh and substantial; yet each piece is written in a clear and non-technical style. The anthology is therefore to be recommended to those new to the various (...) "continental" ways of doing philosophy, as well as to initiates.—C. T. W. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A "Hypostatic Union" of Two Practices but One Person?Paul F. KnitterThis is going to be an awkwardly personal reflection. But that, I understand, is what the assignment given to the members of the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies panel "Constructing Buddhist Identities in the West" called for: I was asked to reflect upon "How I as a Western Christian have appropriated Buddhist practice and teachings into my religious identity." I'm (...) grateful for this invitation, because it has provided me with the occasion to realize, quite startlingly, that what I have thought and written about my "Buddhist-Christian identity" in the past really isn't quite accurate.But first let me offer a bird's eye, and therefore limited, view of my two-faced identity: I was born into a traditional, not very critical, Catholic family in the Chicago of seventy-three years ago. At thirteen, I decided (against my parents' wishes) to enter a minor seminary in order to become a priest, and went through the whole fourteen years of training. For the last four years of that training I had the profoundly good fortune to be sent to Rome, arriving there in 1962, two weeks before more than two thousand bishops marched into St. Peter's Basilica to start the Second Vatican Council (the renewing effects of which were much more lasting, it seems, in my psyche than in the psyche and structures of the Vatican!). Ordained a priest in 1966 and animated with Vatican II's new openness to other religions, I did a dissertation at the University of Marburg, Germany, on Christian theologies of religions. When I returned to the United States in 1972, I taught theology at Catholic Theological Union in Chicago, and when I decided to leave the Catholic priesthood in 1975, I moved to Xavier University in Cincinnati, where I continued teaching theology for some twenty-eight years.It was during those years, in the 1980s, that I began not only to teach courses on Buddhism but also to practice daily Zen meditation. Gradually, I came to realize that Buddhism, its theory and practice, was seeping into and coloring the way I understood and practiced my Christian creed—to the point that in 2007 I took refuge in the Tibetan Dzogchen tradition and since then have been under the guidance of my teacher, Lama John Makransky. It was around this time that I faced the need to figure out just what or who I was—a Buddhist Christian or a Christian Buddhist. So, typical academic that I am, I wrote a book. [End Page 19]In Without Buddha I Could Not Be a Christian, I declared and defended my primary identity as a Christian who was thoroughly drenched in Buddhism.1 But when I recently read Rose Drew's penetrating analysis of various ways of blending dual religious belonging in her Christian or Buddhist? An Exploration of Dual Religious Belonging, I started to wonder.2 From her ethnographic study of actual dual belongers, she found that (a) some have a primary religious identity (the group to which I thought I belonged), (b) some alternate between both primary identities, (c) some cannot attribute primacy to either or any identity, and (d) some are too bewildered by it all to say anything.3 As I pondered Drew's description and analysis of her interviewees' meanderings back and forth across religious lines, I had to admit that I wasn't sure where I belonged. So when the request for this paper came along, I saw it as an opportunity to help myself sort things out.An Inappropriate AnalogyMy problem is that as my Christian and Buddhist practices have continued over these recent five to ten years, more and more, I cannot keep them apart. They remain clearly distinct, but unlike Roger Corless, of blessed memory, I have not been able to honor their distinct identities by practicing them, as Roger apparently did, separately: being a Buddhist from Monday to Thursday, and a Christian from Friday to Sunday (and then waiting to see what would happen). Rather, for me, when I am at Mass, I hear the words of the Scripture readings or of... (shrink)

In this article we defend the inferential view of scientific models and idealisation. Models are seen as “inferential prostheses” (instruments for surrogative reasoning) construed by means of an idealisation-concretisation process, which we essentially understand as a kind of counterfactual deformation procedure (also analysed in inferential terms). The value of scientific representation is understood in terms not only of the success of the inferential outcomes arrived at with its help, but also of the heuristic power of representation and their capacity to (...) correct and improve our models. This provides us with an argument against Sugden’s account of credible models: the likelihood or realisticness (their “credibility”) is not always a good measure of their acceptability. As opposed to “credibility” we propose the notion of “enlightening”, which is the capacity of giving us understanding in the sense of an inferential ability. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in health care. Specifically, several commentators have discussed the implications that conscientious objection has for the delivery of timely, efficient, and nondiscriminatory medical care. In this paper, I discuss the main argument put forward by the most prominent critics of conscientious objection—what I call the Professional Duty Argument or PDA. According to proponents of PDA, doctors should place patients’ well-being and rights at the center of their professional (...) practice. Doctors should be prepared to set their personal moral or religious beliefs aside where these beliefs conflict with what is legal and considered good medical practice by relevant professional associations. Conscientious objection, on this account, should be heavily restricted, if even allowed at all. I discuss two powerful objections against PDA. The first objection, which I call the fallibility objection, notes that law and professional codes of conduct are fallible guides for ethical conduct and that conscientious objection has in the past and continues today to provide a check on aberrations in law and professional convention. The second, which I call the professional discretion objection, states that restrictions on conscientious objection undermine one of the cornerstones of good medical practice, namely, a practitioner’s right to independent professional judgment. I argue that these two objections give us reason to retain conscience clauses in professional codes of conduct. (shrink)

Para completar la exposición de su propio pensamiento Xavier Zubiri dictó en 1968 un ciclo de conferencias titulado Estructura dinámica de la realidad. El texto de esas conferencias es el que ahora, forma este libro. En él analiza el momento dinámico de la realidad, lo que denomina su «dar de sí». Si en Sobre la esencia la realidad era definida como «de suyo», ahora se completaba esa definición afirmando que es, además un «dar de sí». De suyo, la realidad (...) da de sí. Tal podría ser el resumen más apretado de esta obra, que añade precisiones muy importantes a los libros ya publicados en esta misma colección. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

Insurance is pervasive in many social settings. As a cooperative device based on risk pooling, it serves to attenuate the adverse consequences of various risks by offering policyholders coverage against the losses implied by adverse events in exchange for the payment of premiums. In the insurance industry, the concept of actuarial fairness serves to establish what could be adequate, fair premiums. Accordingly, premiums paid by policyholders should match as closely as possible their risk exposure. Such premiums are the product of (...) the probabilities of losses and the expected losses. This article presents a discussion of the fairness of actuarial fairness through three steps: defining the concept based on its formulation within the insurance industry; determining in which sense it may be about fairness; and raising some objections to the actual fairness of actuarial fairness. The necessity of a normative evaluation of actuarial fairness is justified by the influence of the concept on the current reforms of public insurance systems and the fact that it highlights the question of the repartition of the gains and burdens of social cooperation. (shrink)

Conscience is an idea that has significant currency in liberal democratic societies. Yet contemporary moral philosophical scholarship on conscience is surprisingly sparse. This paper seeks to offer a rigorous philosophical account of the role of conscience in moral life with a view to informing debates about the ethics of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that conscience is concerned with a commitment to moral integrity and that restrictions on freedom of conscience prevent agents from living a moral life. In section (...) one I argue that conscience is a principle of moral awareness in rational agents, and that it yields an awareness of the personal nature of moral obligation. Conscience also monitors the coherence between an agent’s identity-conferring beliefs and intentions and their practical actions. In section two I consider how human beings are harmed when they are forced to violate their conscience. Restrictions on the exercise of conscience prevent people from living in accord with their own considered understanding of the requirements of morality and undermine one’s capacity for moral agency. This article concludes with a consideration of how a robust theory of conscience can inform our understanding of conscientious objection in medicine. I argue that it is in the interest of individual practitioners and the medical profession generally to foster moral agency among doctors. This provides a prima facie justification for permitting at least some kinds of conscientious objection. (shrink)

It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting (...) algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of length n may be "completed" conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expanded system does not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a prenex form theorem for a version of Independence Friendly logic, a logic with imperfect information. Lifting classical results to such logics turns out not to be straightforward, because independence conditions make the formulas sensitive to signalling phenomena. In particular, nested quantification over the same variable is shown to cause problems. For instance, renaming of bound variables may change the interpretations of a formula, there are only restricted quantifier extraction theorems, and slashed connectives cannot be (...) so easily removed. Thus we correct some claims from Hintikka [8], Caicedo & Krynicki [3] and Hodges [11]. We refine definitions, in particular the notion of equivalence, and sharpen preconditions, allowing us to restore those claims, including the prenex form theorem of Caicedo & Krynicki [3], and, as a side result, we obtain an application to Skolem forms of classical formulas. It is a known fact that a complete calculus for IF-logic is impossible, but with our results we establish several quantifier rules that form a partial calculus of equivalence for a general version of IF-logic reflecting general properties of information flow in games. (shrink)

There has been significant debate about whether the moral norms of medical practice arise from some feature or set of features internal to the discipline of medicine. In this article, I analyze Edmund Pellegrino’s conception of the internal morality of medicine, and situate it in the context of Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential account of “practice.” Building upon MacIntyre, Pellegrino argued that medicine is a social practice with its own unique goals—namely, the medical, human, and spiritual good of the patient—and that the (...) moral norms that govern medical practice are derived from these goals. After providing an overview of Pellegrino’s work, I discuss some forceful objections to his theory—specifically, that it is too rigid and incapable of entering into dialogue with contemporary values systems; that it is dependent on an external conception of human flourishing; and that it is incompatible with the rapidly changing nature of modern medicine. In the final section of this article, I consider how theorists working in the Hippocratic tradition might respond to these objections against ethical essentialism by drawing upon MacIntyre’s historico-cultural method as well as what he calls Aristotle’s “metaphysical biology.”. (shrink)

Replying to Samuel Knafo and Benno Teschke, this article shows how Political Marxism offers powerful conceptual tools to understand modes of production that structure historical processes as fundamentally constituted by exploitative social and political relations. I explain how structure, or rules of reproduction, should be understood as alienated social relations, which are inherent to all class societies. Understanding structure this way leaves ample space for – and makes inevitable – the consideration of agency.

This paper examines the logic of conditional obligation, which originates from the works of Hansson, Lewis, and others. Some weakened forms of transitivity of the betterness relation are studied. These are quasi-transitivity, Suzumura consistency, acyclicity and the interval order condition. The first three do not change the logic. The axiomatic system is the same whether or not they are introduced. This holds true under a rule of interpretation in terms of maximality and strong maximality. The interval order condition gives rise (...) to a new axiom. Depending on the rule of interpretation, this one changes. With the rule of maximality, one obtains the principle known as disjunctive rationality. With the rule of strong maximality, one obtains the Spohn axiom (also known as the principle of rational monotony, or Lewis’ axiom CV). A completeness theorem further substantiates these observations. For interval order, this yields the finite model property and decidability of the calculus. (shrink)

Many if not most sperm donors in the early years of IVF donated under conditions of anonymity. There is, however, a growing awareness of the ethical cost of withholding identifying parental information from donor children. Today, anonymous donation is illegal in many jurisdictions, and some jurisdictions have gone as far as retrospectively invalidating contracts whereby donors were guaranteed anonymity. This article provides a critical evaluation of the ethics and legality of anonymous donation. We defend Australian and British legislation that has (...) outlawed donor anonymity, and we argue for the establishment of a central registry that provides donor children with the ability to easily and reliably access identifying information about their donor parents. (shrink)

Several ethicists have defended the use of responsibility-based criteria in healthcare rationing. Yet in this article we outline two challenges to the implementation of responsibility-based healthcare rationing policies. These two challenges are, namely, that responsibility for past behavior can diminish as an agent changes, and that blame can come apart from responsibility. These challenges suggest that it is more difficult to hold someone responsible for health related actions than proponents of responsibility-sensitive healthcare policies suggest. We close by discussing public health (...) policies that could function as an alternative to contentious, responsibility-sensitive rationing policies. (shrink)

This paper reports completeness results for dyadic deontic logics in the tradition of Hansson’s systems. There are two ways to understand the core notion of best antecedent-worlds, which underpins such systems. One is in terms of maximality, and the other in terms of optimality. Depending on the choice being made, one gets different evaluation rules for the deontic modalities, but also different versions of the so-called limit assumption. Four of them are disentangled, and compared. The main observation of this paper (...) is that, even in the partial order case, the contrast between maximality and optimality is not as significant as one could expect, because the logic remains the same whatever notion of best is used. This is established by showing that, given analogous properties for the betterness relation, the same system is sound and complete with respect to its intended modelling. The chief result of this paper concerns Åqvist’s system F supplemented with the principle of cautious monotony. It is established that, under the maximality rule, F + is sound and complete with respect to the class of models in which the betterness relation is required be reflexive and smooth . From this, a number of spin-off results are obtained. First and foremost, it is shown that a similar determination result holds for optimality; that is, under the optimality rule, F + is also sound and complete with respect to the class of models in which the betterness relation is reflexive and smooth . Other spin-off results concern classes of models in which further constraints are placed on the betterness relation, like totalness and transitivity. (shrink)

In Racial Prescriptions, Jonathan Xavier Inda offers a critical and timely analysis of the making of BiDil, the first (and only) drug that was marketed exclusively to African Americans. Sibille Merz speaks to him about the re-articulation of racial politics under neoliberalism, the legacies of scientific racism and the molecularization of biopolitics in the genomic age.

Le Pere Xavier Tilliette est l'un des plus grands historiens contemporains de la philosophie. Il est l'auteur d'une monumentale etude en deux volumes sur Schelling... qui il avait d'ailleurs consacre plusieurs autres ouvrages. Il a egalement ecrit d'excellents livres sur d'autres grandes figures de la philosophie occidentale notamment Fichte, Merleau-Ponty, Lequier. Il est aussi et surtout le representant le plus connu d'un genre unique de la philosophie de la religion, celui qui traite des grands themes de la theologie chretienne (...) selon leurs dimensions proprement philosophiques. Rappelons simplement plusieurs travaux tres novateurs sur le Christ et la philosophie, mais aussi sur la philosophie et l'Eglise ou encore la philosophie et l'Eucharistie. Toutefois, Xavier Tilliette n'est pas seulement philosophe, il est aussi un grand erudit de l'histoire litteraire francaise, notamment de l'oeuvre de Paul Claudel. Apres deux Festschrift anterieures parues respectivement en Allemagne et en Italie, ce troisieme recueil publie en l'honneur du Pere Tilliette est edite en Belgique. Il contient trente contributions, plus de la moitie consacrees... l'histoire de la philosophie, avec un nombre eleve de textes sur Schelling. Les autres etudes, tres variees, tres originales, relevent de la philosophie de la religion, de la theologie philosophique et de l'histoire de la litterature. Ces travaux dont les auteurs, en provenance de huit pays et de trois continents, vont de jeunes erudits... peine trentenaires jusqu'aux contemporains de l'illustre jesuite, sont rediges en Francais, en Italien, en Allemand et en Anglais. Ils manifestent et illustrent la fecondite de l'oeuvre de ce disciple fervent des Peres de Lubac et Danielou, son rayonnement extraordinaire, les richesses multivalentes de ses deux-mille publications. (shrink)

We study a class of [0,1][0,1]-valued logics. The main result of the paper is a maximality theorem that characterizes these logics in terms of a model-theoretic property, namely, an extension of the omitting types theorem to uncountable languages.